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Abstract
Rules on special and diﬀerential treatment (SDT) constitute the centerpiece of the
WTO’s strategy for integrating developing countries into the world trading system.
We examine the theoretical rationale for SDT when trade liberalization in developing
countries is impeded by a policy commitment problem. We show that SDT rules, if
reconciled with the principle of reciprocity, can help developing countries to reduce
trade barriers and improve their trading prospects.
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1 Introduction
Multilateral trade rules contain a number of provisions granting Special and Diﬀerential
treatment (SDT) to developing countries. According to the Preamble of the Marakesh
Agreement establishing the WTO, one of the stated objectives of SDT is to “ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the
growth of world trade commensurate with their needs.” Similarly, the 2001 declaration from
the WTO Ministerial Conference launching the Doha Round of trade negotiations states
that a fundamental objective of the negotiations is to improve the trading prospects of
developing countries and that “special and diﬀerential treatment for developing countries
shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations”. STD provisions are thus
intended to encourage the integration of developing countries in the world economy and to
improve their trading prospects.
Yet, these provisions have been criticized for being at odds with their stated objectives.
The main argument behind such criticisms is that SDT provisions violate the principle of
reciprocity – which requires countries to exchange mutual trade concessions – thus discour-
aging developing countries from liberalizing (Roessler, 1998).1,2 As pointed out by Baldwin
(2012), protection is increasingly costly for developing countries, due to the internation-
alization of supply chains. When most production was bundled and trade involved goods
manufactured in one nation being sold in another, allowing poor nations to keep high tariﬀs,
while rich nations liberalized, was seen as a possible way of fostering their infant industries.
The advent of international supply chains that rely crucially on imported intermediates im-
plies that “protection doesn’t protect industry, it destroys it”, as implied by the well-know
rate of eﬀective protection argument. Additionally, Bagwell and Staiger (2014) argue that
SDT provisions for developing countries not only hinder their trade liberalization prospects,
but are also unhelpful in expanding their exports: even if developing countries are allowed
to “free ride” on the reciprocal liberalization eﬀorts of others, unless they reduce their own
tariﬀs, terms of trade changes may leave their export volumes unaﬀected.
If we interpret SDT provisions as a license for developing countries not to engage in
reciprocal liberalization, we should then conclude that they do not encourage liberalization,
do not protect developing countries’ infant industries, do not allow developing countries
to beneﬁt from liberalization by other countries, and ultimately do not give developing
countries their commensurate “share in the growth of world trade”. So, what is their
rationale, if any?
In this paper, we show that special and diﬀerential rules can be reconciled with the
principle of reciprocity and with their stated objectives when developing countries’ policy
commitment hurdles are accounted for. To develop our arguments, we build on earlier
1Although the articles of the GATT/WTO do not provide a precise deﬁnition of reciprocity, the Preamble
of the Marrakesh Agreement refers to the exchange of “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariﬀs and other barriers to trade”.
2O¨zden and Reinhardt (2004) argue that SDT hinder trade liberalization by developing countries. Using
a dataset of 154 developing countries from 1976 through 2000, they ﬁnd that developing countries adopted
more liberal trade policies after being removed from the US Generalized System of Preferences.
1
work (Conconi and Perroni, 2012) and describe a simple model of bilateral trade between a
small developing country and a large trading partner, where the small country suﬀers from
a domestic commitment problem in trade policy formation. This problem arises because
of the presence of sunk investments in the import-competing sector, which leads to ex-
post pressure on governments to enact and maintain protectionist policies; the resulting
policy credibility problem traps the small country in a vicious circle of ineﬃcient protection
and ineﬃcient investment allocation. The small country may in principle overcome this
commitment problem on its own. However, a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large
country lowers its tariﬀs conditionally on the small country doing the same, creare a “carrot
and stick” mechanisms that reinforces policy credibility in the small country, helping to
support its liberalization eﬀorts. By contrast, unilateral concessions by the large country
may actually hinder such eﬀorts.3
Nevertheless, even if conditional reciprocity may be a necessary condition for develop-
ing countries to liberalize, delayed implementation on the part of developing countries, as
granted by SDT provisions, may still be required. The reason for this transitional require-
ment when the developing country is attempting to overcome its trade policy commitment
problem is simple. When capacity in the import-competing sector depreciates in a single
period, transition to a long-run trade liberalization agreement may take place in a single
step, during which both countries reduce their tariﬀs. If instead import-competing capacity
does not depreciate instantaneously, the small country’s commitment problem may prevent
it from immediately lowering its tariﬀs immediately to their long-run level – a hurdle that
would not exist if the small country were not facing a policy commitment problem. In this
case, a reciprocal trade agreement could require a transition phase, during which the small
country reduces its tariﬀ gradually, while the large country already liberalizes. Our analysis
suggest that SDT may still need to be part of an intertemporal carrot-and-stick mechanism
that promotes liberalization by developing countries.
The key insights from our discussion are can be summarized as follows: conditional
reciprocity need not imply simultaneity in trade concessions; requiring simultaneity may
indeed be counterproductive, as this can undermine one of the key beneﬁts developing
countries may receive from entering trade agreements; however, even if developing countries
are allowed to delay their liberalization process, conditional reciprocity needs to be present
in the background. In other words, SDT rules need to be re-interpreted, and possibly re-
written, to be fully in line with the principle of reciprocity, rather than representing an
exception to it, and must be speciﬁcally focused on timing constraints.4
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
3The desire to achieve domestic policy credibility can thus explain why many developing countries
have entered reciprocal trade agreements with large developed countries. Small countries may also have
insurance motives (Perroni and Whalley, 1996, 2000), or may seek to obtain trade concessions in exchange
for concessions on non-trade issues (Lima˜o, 2007).
4In line with this idea, Michalopoulos (2000) argues that “the fundamental justiﬁcation for the extension
of additional time to implement agreed measures relates to weaknesses in the institutional capacity of
developing and least developed countries. It is assumed that, given additional time, developing and least
developed countries will strengthen their institutions in ways that would enable them to implement the
agreements.”
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literature. Section 3 provides a brief history of SDT rules. Section 4 presents the main
features of our model. Section 5 shows that conditionality can help a developing country
achieve trade liberalization. Section 6 shows that, in the presence of capacity constraints, the
developing country may best be helped by conditional (but asynchronous) trade concessions.
Section 7 concludes, discussing the implications of our analysis for the ongoing debate on
SDT rules in the WTO.
2 Related literature
We build on the idea that developing countries enter trade agreements in order to enhance
the credibility of their own domestic policies.5 The commitment argument has often raised
in policy and theoretical debates on trade agreements. For example, it has been argued
that Mexico’s negotiators were mostly driven to join NAFTA by the desire to “tie their
own hands”, so as to boost the credibility of domestic reforms, rather than by market
access considerations (Whalley, 1998). This argument has been formalized by Maggi and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1998), who show that a time-inconsistency problem in trade policy may
arise in a small economy when capital is ﬁxed in the short run but mobile in the long run.
They suggest that entering into binding trade agreements can be a solution to this problem.6
This argument, however, fails to account for the fact that international agreements are
not just like binding contracts: absent a supranational authority with autonomous powers
of enforcement, a country’s international commitments are not directly binding on that
country, but rather they must be sustainable in light of the dynamic incentives that the
country faces vis-a`-vis its trading partners as well as its domestic agents. These dynamic
incentives, and the eﬀect that SDT provisions have on them, are the central focus of our
analysis.
Reciprocity and conditionality are central to theoretical studies on trade agreements
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; 2011). Bagwell and Staiger (2011) point out that developing
countries can only beneﬁts from trade agreements if they do not simply “free ride” on
reciprocal MFN concessions between developed countries, but liberalize in turn. Their
theoretical argument is driven by terms of trade eﬀects. Our paper shows that a similar
argument can be made when developing countries cannot aﬀect their terms of trade, but
suﬀer from a policy commitment problem.
The importance of reciprocity also been emphasized in empirical studies. Subramanian
and Wei (2007) examine the impact of GATT/WTO membership on trade ﬂows. They show
5The available empirical evidence suggests that developing countries face serious domestic credibility
problems. For example, Brunetti et al. (1998) construct an index of institutional credibility based on a
World Bank survey, in which more than 3,600 ﬁrms in seventy-four countries were asked questions aimed at
capturing the reliability of the institutional framework and the credibility of governments’ policy announce-
ments. Their analysis shows that many developing countries are characterized by extremely low credibility
indexes.
6In a subsequent paper, Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2007) extend their analysis to a setting with two
large countries, in which both governments would like to commit vis-a`-vis domestic industrial lobbies. The
idea that undertaking binding international commitments may help to achieve time-consistent trade policy
was ﬁrst put forward by Staiger and Tabellini (1987).
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that industrial countries, which participated actively in reciprocal trade negotiations, have
witnessed a larger increase in trade than developing countries, which had few obligations to
reduce their own trade barriers. Moreover, post-Uruguay Round developing country mem-
bers, which face comparatively more stringent accession requirements, are systematically
more open than old developing country members. Similarly, Tang and Wei (2009) ﬁnd that
countries that became WTO members have generally grown faster, but that these growth
eﬀects can only be observed in those countries that underwent rigorous accession procedures.
3 Evolution of SDT rules in the GATT/WTO
As mentioned earlier, current SDT provisions consists mainly of longer implementation
periods and GSP preferences, both of which are temporary in nature: implementation
periods are transitory by deﬁnition,7 while GSP preferences are lost upon “graduation,” i.e.
when a beneﬁciary country is deemed by the granting country to have attained a suﬃcient
level of progress. Also, there is a strong emphasis on meeting the special needs of the LDCs,
which are granted even longer implementation periods and more favorable GSP preferences.
Since the early years of the GATT, both developed and developing countries have long
accepted the concept of SDT treatment, but its interpretation and implementation in terms
of legal rules have evolved signiﬁcantly over time (e.g. Whalley, 1999; Michalopoulos, 2000).
Until the early 1980s,8 SDT treatment was primarily meant to meet the special problems
of development faced by developing countries, according them special rights to nurture infant
industries and to obtain preferential access to developed countries’ markets. The principle of
non-reciprocity for developing countries (Article XXXVI) indicated recognition of unequal
playing ﬁelds between developed and developing countries. Preferential treatment took
many forms: better market access for exports by developing countries in accordance with
GSP, so that they could boost economic development through exports; a lesser level of
obligations for developing countries which provided them with the necessary ﬂexibility to
pursue policies for industrialization and economic development; and no requirement for
developing countries to sign and adhere to all the agreements in GATT.
In the early 1980s, the situation changed rather dramatically. There was a broad con-
sensus that the past approach to SDT had been disappointing in that it had provided little
incentive for developing countries to participate more fully in the multilateral trading system
(Whalley, 1999). There was also a growing disenchantment with the development strategy
7The length of the transition periods for developing countries varies considerably: from two years (SPS
and Import Licensing), ﬁve years (TRIMs, Custom Valuation, and TRIPS), ten years (agriculture) and even
up to an undetermined time (GATS).
8The important milestones in this period are: (i) the modiﬁcation of Article XVIII of GATT in 1954-55
to allow developing countries to use trade restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes and infant industry
protection; (ii) the establishment of UNCTAD and the creation of the Committee on Trade and Development
in the GATT in 1964; (iii) the addition of Part IV on Trade and Development to the GATT in 1965; and (iv)
the adoption of the Enabling Clause in 1979, which, by allowing GATT members to grant tariﬀ preferences
to developing countries and LDCs without having to grant the same treatment to industrialized countries,
eﬀectively sheltered these sorts of preferences from the GATT’s MFN obligations.
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based on import substitution (Kreuger, 1997; Bora et al., 2000). This led to a change of
focus in the use of SDT from problems of development to problems of implementation.
In the ﬁrst six rounds of GATT negotiations, developing countries were not expected
to make signiﬁcant tariﬀ commitments. This changed drastically with the Uruguay Round
of trade negotiations (1986-1994), at which “developing countries took on unprecedented
obligations not only to reduce trade barriers, but to implement signiﬁcant reforms both
on trade procedures (e.g., import licensing procedures, customs valuation) and on many
areas of regulation that establish the basic business environment in the domestic economy”
(Finger and Schuler, 2000). Developing countries were required to make eﬀorts to liberalize
their economies and could not opt out of parts of the agreements, which were all bundled
together as the Single Undertaking. However, they were granted longer periods to meet
their commitments9 and were allowed to bind their tariﬀs at very high rates.10
The WTO Ministerial Declaration states that “all special and diﬀerential treatment
provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more
precise, eﬀective and operational.” Although various proposals have been put forward, no
agreement has yet been reached.
4 Domestic commitment and trade preferences
In a recent paper (Conconi and Perroni, 2012), we examine how the relationship with a large
trading partner can aﬀect a small country’s ability to overcome a commitment problem in
trade liberalization. The question we address is the following: should developing countries be
granted broader market access by developed countries unconditionally or only conditionally
on them undertaking policies to liberalize their own economies? Should conditionality take
the form of an asynchronous exchange of concessions, with the large country liberalizing
before the small country does?
To address these questions, we develop a simple trade model between two countries, a
home country and a foreign country (represented by a “*”), each producing an exportable
good and an import-competing good. The home country is assumed to be small, i.e. unable
to aﬀect its terms of trade through its own trade policies, while the foreign country is
assumed to be large. Thus the terms of trade facing the small country are determined by
domestic prices in the economy of the large country.
In the remainder of this section, we provide a brief description of our model and a
summary of the main results in Conconi and Perroni (2012). In the following section, we
show that the presence of capacity constraints may require the large country to oﬀer trade
concessions ﬁrst, conditional on the small country liberalizing at the end of a transition
9For example, the Uruguay Round Agreement required industrialized countries to implement provision
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) within one year, but granted developing
countries a transition period of ﬁve years (extendable to ten years for technology sectors where no previous
intellectual property protection was accorded). For LDCs the allowed delay was eleven years (see Beshkar
et al, 2012).
10The gap between the applied MFN tariﬀ and their bound rates (the “tariﬀ overhang”) is very large for
developing countries, particularly in agricultural sectors. For example, (see Bchir et al., 2006).
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period.
4.1 The small country’s commitment problem
Two goods, X and Y , are produced and traded, with X being exported and Y being
imported by the home country (the reverse being the case for the large country). Countries
levy ad valorem import tariﬀs, t and t∗, which drive a wedge between prices in the exporting
and importing countries. The domestic prices of importables in the home and foreign
countries are thus pY = p
∗
Y (1 + t) and p
∗
X = pX(1 + t
∗), respectively.
Production of the export good in the home country uses labor and exhibits constant-
returns-to-scale. The import-competing good is produced using capital alone. In turn,
capital (capacity) is produced using labor and a speciﬁc factor present in ﬁxed supply (e.g.
land), which implies an increasing marginal cost in terms of labor inputs. In the benchmark
version of the model, capital is assumed to fully depreciate at the end of each period. In
Section 5, we show that relaxing this assumption can help us to reconcile the observed
features of SDT provisions with their stated goals.
At any given period, a certain amount of labor must be devoted to generate capital to be
employed in the production of import-competing goods in subsequent periods. We assume
that investors in the home country are individually small and forward-looking, i.e. they
make their choices on the basis of expected prices. Once investment decisions have been
made, the ex-post domestic supply of importables is ﬁxed. This implies that any divergence
between expected prices and realized prices will give rise to positive or negative quasi-rents
accruing to domestic investors, which are equal to the diﬀerence between the actual and the
expected value of the investment:
(p− pE)S(pE). (1)
Quasi rents represent the gap between the actual value of import-competing supply (which
is ﬁxed ex post) and the value that was anticipated by investors. In an intertemporal
equilibrium where all policies (and therefore prices) are fully anticipated, quasi-rents are
always zero. However, oﬀ the equilibrium path, unanticipated policy changes can generate
positive or negative quasi-rents.
In this setting, aggregate welfare is given by
∫ pE
0
S(z)dz + (p− pE)S(pE) +
∫ ∞
p
D(z)dz + t(1 + t∗)
(
D(p)− S(pE)
) ≡ W. (2)
The ﬁrst two terms capture producer surplus associated with the installed capacity and
with the quasi-rents obtained if realized prices diverge from expected ones. The last two
terms represents, respectively, consumer surplus and tariﬀ revenues.
We assume that, after investment has taken place, investors successfully manage to
form a lobby – solving the free-riding problem described by Olson (1965) – whose objective
is to aﬀect trade policies so as to maximize quasi-rents. Consistently with the political
contributions model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that the
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incumbent policymaker is semi-benevolent, i.e. his objective function is a weighted sum of
aggregate welfare and lobbies’ surplus:
Π ≡ W + λ(p− pE)S(pE), (3)
where λ > 0 is an additional weight that the policymaker attaches to quasi-rents.
Suppose that the small country is facing a given import tariﬀ by the large country, t∗.
The unilaterally optimal import tariﬀ for the policymaker in the small country is that which
maximizes (3), given t∗. If the policymaker could commit to a tariﬀ level before capacity
is installed, p could not depart from pE, and there would be no quasi-rents to lobby for.
Unilateral liberalization (t = 0) would then maximize the small country’s welfare, as well
as the objective of the policymaker for any level of t∗, independently of whether or not the
policymaker is benevolent (i.e. independently of the value of λ).
If the policymaker can commit to trade policy choices before capacity is installed, realized
prices and expected prices will always coincide, and quasi-rents can never arise; in this case,
it is easy to show that free trade is the optimal trade policy choice, which maximizes
aggregate welfare.
If instead the policymaker cannot commit to trade policy choices before capacity is
installed, realized prices can diﬀer from expected prices and out-of-equilibrium quasi-rents
can arise. In the absence of commitment, trade policy choices will have to be made after
private investment choices are made. The equilibrium trade policy is the outcome of a
positive feedback mechanism: the presence of installed import-competing capacity drives
the ex-post optimal tariﬀ above zero; in turn, the expectation of above-zero tariﬀs encourages
the formation of import-competing capacity. Although investors are fully forward-looking
and quasi-rents vanish in equilibrium, when investment precedes policy choices, the potential
for quasi-rents to arise oﬀ the equilibrium path, because of the lobbying pressure associated
with them, produces policies that are ex ante suboptimal.
Given that quasi-rents are zero in equilibrium, the policymaker in the small country will
always be strictly worse oﬀ in an equilibrium with positive tariﬀs than under unilateral liber-
alization; however, the inability to pre-commit may prevent the policymaker from achieving
unilateral trade liberalization. That is, trade liberalization in the small country is optimal
from a long-run perspective, but not credible in the short run – a time-consistency prob-
lem which traps the small country in a vicious circle of ineﬃcient protection and ineﬃcient
investment allocation.
Notice that, in our setup, lobbying owes its very existence to the inability of policymak-
ers to credibly pre-commit to trade policy before investment decisions are made. Although
investors are fully forward-looking and quasi-rents vanish in equilibrium, when investment
precedes policy choices, the potential for quasi-rents to arise oﬀ the equilibrium path, be-
cause of the lobbying pressure associated with them, produces policies that are ex ante
suboptimal. Policy commitment, on the other hand, fully removes the potential for quasi-
rents and thus any eﬀect of lobbying on trade policy.11 This is diﬀerent from, but related
11A similar policy commitment problem that hinges on oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path incentives is the invest-
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to, the mechanism described Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1998), in which lobbying comes
from owners of factors that are inter-sectorally mobile in the long run, but immobile in the
short run. Both mechanisms result in ex-post, short-term frictions to trade liberalization.12
4.2 The impact of trade concessions by the large country
In this section, we summarize the main ﬁndings of Conconi and Perroni (2012), in which we
examine the small country’s ability to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism.
The literature on policy credibility has appealed to the well-known idea that repeated
interaction with the private sector creates incentives to maintain “reputation” and can there-
fore help overcome credibility problems, or at least mitigate them. As described in Stokey
(1989), when the interaction between each government and its domestic investors is repeated
indeﬁnitely, time-consistency policy problems can be solved by punishment strategies that
involve a permanent reversion by the private sector to the expectation of future ineﬃcient
policies. The idea is simply that, if reneging on a policy promise entails a permanent loss
of credibility, the prospect of future losses can be suﬃcient to prevent a forward-looking
government from going back on its promises. In our model, along the equilibrium path in
which the small country’s government keeps its tariﬀ at zero, investors anticipate that free
trade will be sustained, so they install little capacity and do not lobby the government for
protection. Any deviation from this path would result in investors losing credibility in the
government’s free trade stance, increasing installed capacity, and lobbying for higher tariﬀs
so as to maximize their quasi-rents.13
We consider three alternative scenarios. The ﬁrst is one in which the small country’s
government must sustain free trade on its own, i.e. without relying on trade concessions by
the large trading partner. In a scenario where the small country faces a ﬁxed large-country
tariﬀ t
∗
, free trade may be sustainable by the small country in a reputation equilibrium
where a deviation from tL = 0 in any given period results in investors indeﬁnitely reverting
to the expectation of a tariﬀ tPF = t(t
∗
). Along an equilibrium path where t = 0, investors
anticipate zero tariﬀs and the equilibrium payoﬀ is thus Π(0, t
∗
, 0, t
∗
), with the last two
argument representing the tariﬀ levels anticipated by investors. If the small country deviates
to a tariﬀ tD > 0, the deviation is not anticipated by investors, and the deviation payoﬀ
is Π(tD, t
∗
, 0, t
∗
). Free trade is then sustainable as long as the gain that the small country
would experience from deviating from free trade in a given period does not exceed the
ment hold-up problem with respect to capital taxes (Kehoe, 1989). In that case, the problem arises because
of the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path incentives government faces to tax capital income, even if investment, and
thus capital income, fully vanish in equilibrium.
12Such frictions are often alluded to in the debate on trade liberalization and development, and are
typically described in terms of short-run adjustment costs (negative quasi-rents in our terminology) being a
key obstacle to liberalization in developing countries. These costs may be associated with capital as well as
with labor inputs (e.g. the job dislocation costs experienced by workers in import-competing sectors, who
had invested in sector-speciﬁc skills in anticipation of continued protection).
13For an extensive institutional discussion of credibility and reputational problems in developing coun-
tries’ trade policy reforms, see Rodrik (1992).
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reduction in the future discounted payoﬀ that would ensue:
Π(tD, t
∗
, 0, t
∗
)− Π(0, t∗, 0, t∗) ≤ δ
1− δ
(
Π(0, t
∗
, 0, t
∗
)− Π(tPF , t∗, tPF , t∗)
)
, (4)
where tD ≡ t
(
t
∗
, S(pL)
)
, is the optimal deviation from free trade, tPF ≡ t
(
t
∗
, S(pPF )
)
is
the tariﬀ in a no-reputation, perfect-foresight protection equilibrium, with pL = 1 + t
∗ and
pPF = (1+tPF )(1+t
∗). In this case, trade liberalization can be achieved exclusively through
domestic incentives: if reneging on a policy promise – even only once – entails a permanent
loss of credibility, the prospect of future losses can be suﬃcient to prevent a forward-looking
government from going back on its promises.
The second scenario we consider is one in which the small country’s liberalization is
accompanied by the large country unconditionally reducing its tariﬀ to t∗ < t∗. In this case,
the incentive constraint for the small country’s government to be able to sustain free trade
is
Π(tD, t
∗, 0, t∗)− Π(0, t∗, 0, t∗) ≤ δ
1− δ
(
Π(0, t∗, 0, t∗)− Π(tPF , t∗, tPF , t∗)
)
. (5)
We show that such unconditional liberalization has an ambiguous eﬀect on the ability of the
small country’s government to sustain free trade. Formally, the critical discount factor for
which (4) is met with equality might be higher or lower than the critical discount factor that
solves (5) with equality. The intuition for this ambiguity is that, when foreign tariﬀs are
lower, less capacity is installed in the small country’s import-competing sector; this reduces
lobbying pressure by investors – leading to a reduction in the gains from defecting from free
trade – but also reduces the Nash reversion tariﬀ and hence the adverse consequences of
a loss of reputation – leading to a reduction in the long-run cost of defections; the overall
impact on defection incentives is therefore ambiguous. Thus, if the government is unable
to credibly pre-commit before investment decisions are made, “trade policy leadership” by
the large country (Coates and Ludema, 2001) may be of no help to the small country in its
eﬀort to sustain low tariﬀs.
Finally, we contrast the implications of unconditional concessions with those of a recipro-
cal trade agreement in which the large country’s tariﬀ reduction from t
∗
to t∗ is conditional
on the small country reducing its own tariﬀs from tPF = t(t
∗
) to tL = 0. In this third
scenario, free trade is sustainable for the small country as long as
Π(tD, t
∗, 0, t∗)− Π(0, t∗, 0, t∗) ≤ δ
1− δ
(
Π(0, t∗, 0, t∗)− Π(tPF , t∗, tPF , t∗)
)
. (6)
When compared to a situation in which the large country does not intervene or in which it
unilaterally liberalizes, such an agreement always makes it easier for the small country to
overcome its commitment problem. Formally the critical discount factor that solves equation
(6) with equality is always lower than the corresponding critical discount factor for equations
(4) and (5). The reason behind this result is that conditional tariﬀ concessions by the large
country provides both a “carrot” and a “stick”: it reduces the gains from defecting from
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free trade, without reducing the severity of the punishment.
Thus, the need to overcome a policy credibility problem can be an important driver for
smaller developing countries in entering into trade agreements with larger countries; yet, in
order to fulﬁl this role, such agreements should involve reciprocity – i.e. the fact that small
countries face a policy commitment problem does not, it itself, recommend that reciprocity
should be dispensed with. Nevertheless, as we show in the next section, reciprocity might
need to take a diﬀerent form – speciﬁcally, it might need to be delayed.
5 Conditionality and transitional SDT provisions
We now come to the heart of our discussion, namely the question of how we SDT provisions
can be reconciled with reciprocity. As some of their critics have pointed out, the structure
of SDT rules seems at odds with the notion of reciprocity and with our previous conclusion
that conditional reciprocity is the best mechanism for bolstering liberalization eﬀorts by
small developing countries. However, reading SDT provisions as necessarily involving a
relaxation of conditionality can be misleading: simultaneous bilateral liberalization need
not imply conditionality and, conversely, conditionality may be present even when trade
concessions do not take place simultaneously.
When the small country faces a policy commitment problem such as the one we have
have described in the previous sections, and if capacity in the import-competing sector
depreciates in a single period, transition to a long-run trade liberalization agreement can
take place in a single step, during which both countries reduce their tariﬀs. If instead import-
competing capacity can only be reduced gradually, the developing countries may not be able
to immediately lower tariﬀs to their long-run level.14 As the following discussion shows, a
reciprocal trade agreement may then require asynchronous exchange of concessions.
Consider a situation in which in which (6) is met with equality, implying that free trade
can “just be sustained” by the small country when the large country oﬀers reciprocal trade
concessions.
Let us denote with SL ≡ S(1 + t∗) the equilibrium capacity of the small country’s
import-competing sector in the long-run trade deal (tL = 0, t
∗). If, starting from a higher
level, capacity can immediately be adjusted downwards, it would be possible at any point
in time to “jump” to tariﬀs (0, t∗). If, however, capacity cannot be instantaneously adjusted
to its long-run equilibrium level, the small country may not be able to sustain free trade
instantaneously.
To develop our argument, we shall assume that there is an upper bound on capital
14The importance of adjustment costs is stressed by Brainard and Verdier (1994), who show in a political
economy model of lobbying that capacity constraints can explain the persistence of protection. The literature
on self-enforcing trade agreements has put forward alternative explanations for gradualism. For example,
in Furusawa and Lai (1999) gradualism arises because of adjustment costs incurred when labor moves
between sectors, while in Bond and Park (2002) it is the result of an asymmetry in country size; in Chisik
(2003), gradualism arises instead from increasing interdependence between the trading partners, due to
irreversible investments in the export sector. What we are addressing here is not gradualism per se, but
the compatibility of transitional asymmetries with long-run conditionality.
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depreciation and denote with φ ∈ (0, 1) the rate at which capacity in the import-competing
sector can be reduced from one period to the next. Then, if Sj is capacity at period
j and Nj is the level of new capacity investment at j, the level of capacity at j + 1 is
Sj+1 = (Sj +Nj)(1− φ).
Figure 1: Transitional and Long-run Tariﬀs and Capacity
Period: j − 2 j − 1 j j + 1 . . .
Tariﬀ: tj−2 tT 0 0 . . .
Capacity: S0 S0(1− φ) ≤ ST ≤ SL/(1− φ) SL SL . . .
To focus on the small country’s transition incentives, we shall assume that the large
country sets the same tariﬀ t∗ in transition phase as in the long run agreement, implying
pT = (1 + tT )(1 + t
∗). For simplicity, consider the scenario depicted in Figure 1, where it is
conceivable to reach the long-run agreement (0, t∗) in two periods, at j, but it is not possible
to do so in one period. This happens if, starting from a certain level of installed capacity,
S0, at j − 2 (inherited from earlier periods) the rate of depreciation is such that
SL
(1− φ)2 ≥ S0 ≥
SL
1− φ. (7)
Notice that the long-run agreement (tL = 0, t
∗) can only be achieved at period j if the
capacity for period j− 1, planned at j− 2 on the basis of the tariﬀs expected at j− 1, does
not exceed SL/(1 − φ). This implies that convergence to the long-run agreement at j is
only possible for suﬃciently low transitional tariﬀs at j − 1. An overall self-enforcing trade
liberalization path for the small country will require the small country’s transitional and
long-run tariﬀs to be sustainable, given its deviation incentives and the punishment that
accompanies deviations.
We can show that, given the cooperative tariﬀ of the large country, the small country
may need to liberalize gradually, setting a tariﬀ tT in period j−1 that exceeds its long-term
tariﬀ tL = 0. Notice that, under the assumption of Nash-reversion punishment strategies,
the punishment that the small country faces for defecting from tT during the transition is the
same as that faced from defecting from tL = 0 in the long run: a deviation from tT at at j−1,
is followed by a reversion to tariﬀs (tN , t
∗
N) from j onwards rather than tariﬀs (0, t
∗
), where
t∗N = t
∗
, and tN = t(t
∗
); the same punishment applies if the small country deviates from the
long-run tariﬀ tL = 0 from j onwards. In contrast, transitional deviation incentives diﬀer
from long-run deviation incentives, since the small country’s import-competing capacity is
larger at j − 1 than at j, so that its investors can earn larger quasi-rents. In turn, this
implies that the small country faces a stronger temptation to deviate from the agreement.
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Let us then examine the transitional deviation incentives of the small country. The
capacity at j − 1 installed at j − 2 on the basis of the tariﬀs expected at j − 2 can be
determined as follows. We can identify a function, S˜(pT ), relating transitional capacity to
the transitional gross-of-tariﬀ price of importables, pT = (1+ tT )(1 + t
∗), where S˜ ′(.) > 0.15
This represents the optimal level of capacity when there is positive investment at j−2. When
the depreciated initial capacity exceeds planned capacity S˜(pT ), the size of the import-
competing sector will be S0(1− φ). Hence,
ST (tT , t
∗) ≡ max{S0(1− φ), S˜(pT )} > SL. (8)
The transitional deviation gain for the small country can be written as
ΔT (tT , t
∗, S0) ≡
∫ pT
pD
D(z)dz + (1 + t∗)
(
tD
(
D(pD)− S(pE)
)− tT (D(pT )− S(pE))
)
+(1 + λ)(pD − pT )S(pE) (9)
where pE = (1+ tT )(1− t∗) is the expected price of importables in the transition agreement
and pD = (1 + tD)(1− t∗) is the price when the small country optimally deviates from the
transition agreement.
Looking at (9), it can be easily veriﬁed that ∂ΔT/∂ST > 0. Thus, during the transition
(at j − 1), the small country faces a stronger temptation to increase its tariﬀ above the
agreed-upon level in comparison with the long-run (from j onwards). This, however, does
not imply that transitional tariﬀs in the small country must be higher than long-run tariﬀs.
In order to characterize the set of sustainable transitional tariﬀ combinations, we need to
consider both unilateral policy deviation incentives and investment incentives in the small
country’s import-competing sector. Speciﬁcally, given a “just sustainable” long-term tariﬀ
tL = 0, sustainable transitional tariﬀ tT are identiﬁed by the following conditions:
1. Transitional deviation gains do not exceed long-run deviation gains:
ΔT (tT , t
∗, S0) ≤ ΔL(0, t∗, SL), (10)
2. Given expected tariﬀs (tT , t
∗), capacity at j − 1 does not exceed SL/(1− φ):
ST (tT , t
∗) ≤ SL/(1− φ). (11)
15Assume that the cost of installing new capacity at j is a function of the level of capacity installed, in
such a way that the marginal cost depends on the total level of capacity, and suppose that this cost can be
expressed as Γ
(
C((Sj +Nj)(1−φ))−C(Sj(1−φ))
)
, where, without loss of generality, Γ ≡ δ/(1− δ(1−φ)).
If the expected domestic price of importables from j + 1 onwards is pE – as is the case in a long-run
agreement with constant tariﬀs – the expected present value of the revenue ﬂow from the new investment is
ΓpE(1− φ)Nj . Then, the optimal level of new capacity investment at j will be identiﬁed by the condition
pE = C
′(Sj+1), as before. In the case of a two-period transition, the present value, at j − 2, of the revenue
ﬂow from a level of investment Nj−2 can be expressed as δ(1−φ)Nj−2pT +
(
δ2(1−φ)2/(1−δ(1−φ)))Nj−2pL
(where pL is the long-run price). Then, letting ST = (1− φ)(Sj−2 +Nj−2) and equating marginal revenue
with the marginal cost of investment gives C ′(S˜T ) = (1− δ(1− φ))pT + δ(1− φ)pL.
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These conditions identify a set of feasible transitional tariﬀ combinations.
To obtain a more precise characterization, we employ a diﬀerential approach, which we
develop as follows. Consider scenarios where capacity depreciates just fast enough that a
two-period transition is feasible, i.e. where no investment in capacity takes place during the
transition and S0(1− φ)2 = SL. In such borderline scenario, if we make the initial capacity
level S0 progressively closer to the long-run level SL, the sustainable transitional tariﬀ will
approach tL = 0. Notice that in this limit scenario, a fast transition to tL = 0 from j
onwards is only possible if ST (tT , t
∗) ≡ max{S0(1− φ), S˜(pT )} = S0(1− φ), i.e. if given the
tariﬀs prevailing in the transition, import-competing are in a situation in which they would
like to reduce capacity.
Let
(
dtT
dS0
)
S0=SL
≡ θ. (12)
Notice that θ captures the marginal diﬀerences between transitional and long-run tariﬀs for
the small country, in the neighborhood of a limit scenario with S0 = SL: if θ > 0, we have
tT > 0, i.e. transitional tariﬀs in the small country are higher than its long-run tariﬀs.
Then, for S0 approaching SL and φ = 1− (S0/SL)1/2, the developing country can reduce
its tariﬀ to tL = 0 from j onwards, passing through a single transitional period in which
t = tT , if there exists a θ that satisﬁes the following system of linear inequalities
∂ΔT
∂t
θ +
∂ΔT
∂S
≤ 0, (13)
θS˜′(p)− 1 ≤ 0. (14)
Condition (13) must be met in order for punishment to deter defections during the transition
phase; condition (14) must be met for capacity to depreciate to its long-run level.
It can be shown that a fast transition to a low-tariﬀ regime may require the small
country to adopt transitional tariﬀs that are higher than its long-run tariﬀs. To see this,
notice that, when S0(1 − φ)2 = SL, a fast transition to tL = 0 from period j onwards
requires the import-competing capacity at j−1 not to exceed the depreciated initial capacity,
ST (tT , t
∗) = S0(1 − φ). In this regime, the size of the Y sector does not depend on tT and
an increase in the small country’s transitional tariﬀ has the following eﬀect on its deviation
incentives:16
∂ΔT
∂tT
= (1 + t∗)2
(
tDD
′(pD)− tTD′(pT )
)
< 0. (15)
16Equation (15) is derived by diﬀerentiating (9), exploiting the ﬁrst-order condition for a unilaterally
optimal deviation by the small country, tD(1 + t
∗)D′(pD) + λS(pT ) = 0, and noting that in a perfect-
foresight transitional equilibrium S(pE) = S(pT ). The second-order condition for an optimal deviation
requires tDD
′(pD)− tTD′(pT ) < 0, implying that (15) must be negative.
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Starting from S0 = SL, an increase in capacity has the following eﬀect on deviation incen-
tives:
∂ΔT
∂S
= λ(1 + t∗)(tD − tT ) > 0. (16)
Condition (14) requires that capacity investment must not be too responsive to prices. Plug-
ging (15) and (16) into condition (13), it is straightforward to verify that a fast transition
to the long run agreement (tL = 0, t
∗) requires θ > 0. This implies that, in this limit case
scenario, the small country can only move to low tariﬀs tL = 0 at period j by going through
a transitional period (j − 1), in which it adopts higher tariﬀs, tT > 0.
It follows that, if capacity in the small country’s import-competing sector cannot imme-
diately adjust to its long-run level, a reciprocal trade agreement may require an asynchronous
exchange of concessions, with the large country liberalizing before the small country does.
Such pattern, however, is the result of a reciprocal trade agreement in which conditionality
– the threat of a long-run reversion to t
∗
by the large country if the small country fails
to complete its transition to liberalization – allows the small country to overcome its com-
mitment problem. Thus, reciprocity – the conditional exchange of trade concessions – is
essential to induce liberalization by the small country. Notice, however, that conditionality
may not be apparent when the exchange of concessions is not simultaneous, even if it is
present in an intertemporal sense. This might explain why previous studies have criticized
SDT provisions as being at odds with the principle of reciprocity (Roessler, 1998; Bagwell
and Staiger, 2011).
It can also be shown that a fast transition to liberalization by the small country may
additionally require that the transitional tariﬀ by the large country, t∗T , is lower than its
long-run tariﬀ, t∗, a feature that is consistent with temporary GSP concessions. Speciﬁcally,
let us denote with tT (t
∗) the minimum transitional tariﬀ that the small country can sustain
if the large country adopts a transitional tariﬀ equal to its long-run tariﬀ, i.e. t∗T = t
∗. If
S˜
(
tT (t
∗), t∗
)
(1− φ) > SL, achieving a fast transition to the long-run agreement (tL = 0, t∗)
will require t∗T < t
∗.17 The intuition for this result is that a lower tariﬀ by the large
country helps to contain capacity investment in the small country’s import-competing sector,
reducing its deviation incentives in the transition period.
Then, consistently with the structure of SDT provisions in the WTO, there will be a
transition phase, in which the large country liberalizes before the small country does –
and where indeed the large country liberalizes preferentially vis-a`-vis the small country.
Notice that this sequence of events does not result from unilateral tariﬀ reductions by the
large country inducing liberalization in the small country, as in the mode of “trade policy
leadership” of Coates and Ludema (2001); it is instead part of a trade deal, in which
liberalization in the small country is sustained by the large country’s threat of retaliation.
The intuition for this result is that, since the ability of the small country to lower its
tariﬀs depends on the level of installed import-competing capacity, it may be impossible to
17For this to be the case, the transition price, pT =
((
1+ tT (t
∗
T )
)(
1+ t∗T
))
– and thus planned capacity
in the transition period – must be increasing in the large country’s tariﬀ.
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sustain lower tariﬀs until its capacity has depreciated suﬃciently. During a transition phase
– when installed capacity is still large – the developing country faces a stronger temptation
to increase its tariﬀ above the agreed-upon level in comparison with the long-run. An
immediate reduction in tariﬀs by its large partner may ease the transition, by encouraging
trade and preventing the build up of new import-competing capacity in the small country.
In other words, higher tariﬀs in the small country may be required in the transition phase,
even if the large country already liberalizes during the transition. Such pattern, however,
need not imply lack of conditionality; on the contrary, conditional reciprocity is needed to
support the small country’s liberalization eﬀorts.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that SDT under existing WTO rules can be interpreted as a
mechanism whereby a large developed country helps a small developing country to overcome
domestic commitment problems in trade liberalization.
To formalize this argument, we have described a model of trade relations between a
small developing country and a large developed country. The small country’s government
faces a time inconsistency problem that arises because investors, after having installed sunk
capacity in the import-competing sector, put pressure on the government to raise tariﬀs
so as to increase their quasi-rents. In this setting, free trade is optimal from a long-run
perspective, but it is not credible in the short-run, i.e. if the government cannot commit to
tariﬀ choices before investment decisions are made.
Previous studies have assumed that international agreements are automatically binding,
as if a simple signature allowed policymakers to “tie their own hands”. Our analysis focuses
instead on the dynamic incentives that the small country continuously faces when trying to
sustain free trade, and the eﬀect that a trade policy relationship with the large country has
on these incentives.
We have shown that the desire to achieve domestic policy credibility can motivate a small
developing countries to enter a reciprocal trade agreement with a large developed country. If
the developing country can only gradually reduce capacity in the import-competing sector,
trade concessions may be reciprocal but asynchronous: the large country will liberalize ﬁrst,
expecting the small country to do the same after a transition period. In each period, trade
liberalization in the small country is sustained by the threat of future punishment by the
large country. Although conditionality could be present only implicitly, certain explicit
legal provisions provide strong support for our interpretation of SDT rules as part of a
carrot-and-stick mechanism to foster trade liberalization in developing countries.
Our analysis reconciles observed SDT provisions with their objectives as stated in the
WTO agreements, by showing that temporary SDT can help developing countries to over-
come their institutional problems and encourage them to liberalize their economies. Tempo-
rary preferences can indeed produce a ratchet eﬀect on liberalization incentives, so that they
are no longer required once the initial institutional hurdles have been overcome. Further-
more, contrary to the view held by some in the policy debate, reciprocity and conditionality
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are consistent with SDT rules.
Our results have implications for the ongoing debate on the design of SDT rules in the
WTO. The Doha Declaration states that WTO agreements should aﬀord the opportunity
for developing countries to undertake “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments.”
This statement could be read to mean that developing countries, or at least the smaller ones,
do not need to undertake substantial trade liberalization commitments, and they should be
allowed to have a “free ride” on the negotiations. Our analysis suggests that this may
hinder the ability of developing countries to overcome their policy credibly problems. It
may instead be in the best interest of these countries to interpret the statement as implying
that they are expected to pursue trade reforms, but may be accorded longer transition
periods to implement them.
One of the main complaints about the current system is the fact that most SDT provi-
sions are not legally binding, either because they are not explicitly included in the WTO
agreements or because they are simply expressed as “best endeavor” clauses. For this rea-
son, the Trade and Development Committee has been mandated to consider the legal and
practical implications of turning them into mandatory obligations. Another recurrent com-
plaint is the fact that the transitory nature of SDT privileges makes them “eroding assets”
(Stevens, 2003). There have also been calls for SDT to be granted in a nondiscriminatory
fashion, in line with a kind of “Most Favored GSP Nation” principle.18
Our analysis challenges these criticisms. To begin with, including all SDT provisions
in the WTO agreements in the form of explicit commitments would not by itself aﬀect
their enforceability. Moreover, if a transitional SDT regime is required to help developing
countries to successfully liberalize their economies, one cannot say that its value is eroded
following graduation. Finally, our analysis suggests that discriminating across beneﬁciaries
may be required to deal successfully with diﬀerent adjustment costs.
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